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This paper documents the presence of non-economic career motivations in the U.S. labor market, explores
reasons why such motivations could arise, and provides an explanation for why they might have persisted
across many generations. The analysis links ethnic (migrant) labor market networks in the American
Midwest when it was first being settled, the local identity or attachment to place that emerged endogenously
to maintain the integrity of these networks, and occupational choice today. While fractionalization
may adversely affect the performance of secular institutions, ethnic competition in the labor market
could at the same time have strengthened within-group loyalty and parochial institutions. These values
and their complementary institutions, notably the church, could have mutually reinforced each other
over many overlapping generations, long after the networks themselves had ceased to be salient. Counties
with greater ethnic fractionalization in 1860 are indeed associated with steadily increasing participation
in select religious denominations historically dominated by the migrants all the way through the twentieth
century. Complementing this result, individuals born in high fractionalization counties are significantly
less likely to select into geographically mobile professional occupations and, hence, to migrate out
of their county of birth, despite the fact that these counties are indistinguishable from low fractionalization












The textbook economic model assigns individuals to occupations on the basis of their ability, the
opportunities they have to invest in human capital, and the types of jobs that are subsequently made
available to them in the labor market. Outside of economics, social scientists have long argued that
non-economic factors can also determine career choices. Weber's (1930) writings on the Protestant
ethos are the classic reference in this literature. Contemporary sociologists have also described, for
example, how working class communities instill values in their members that shape their aspirations and
restrict occupational mobility (Gans 1962). Our objective in this paper is to document the presence of
such non-economic motivations in the U.S. labor market, to explore the reasons why such motivations
could arise, and to understand why they might persist across many generations.
We start with the idea that social groups can endogenously instill values in their members that
increase loyalty and reduce the propensity to exit, particularly when they are vulnerable to accul-
turation (Bisin and Verdier 2000) or in competition with other groups (Sumner 1906). The negative
consequences of population heterogeneity, typically measured by fractionalization along various eco-
nomic and social dimensions, are well documented in the economics literature.1 While ethnic or racial
fractionalization may adversely aect the performance of secular institutions, we argue that such frac-
tionalization can at the same time strengthen within-group loyalty and parochial institutions. These
values and their complementary institutions tend to be persistent and can shape career choices long
after the economic forces that gave rise to them have ceased to be salient.
In the setting that we consider { the American Midwest { the labor market was the primary
domain in which ethnic groups interacted. Migrant workers had to bear most of the uctuations
in labor demand in the early stages of industrialization in the United States (Hoerder 1991). This is
precisely the situation in which labor market networks are most useful and there is a wealth of historical
evidence documenting the role played by ethnic migrant networks in nding jobs for their members at
this time. With the arrival of the railroads around 1850, the Midwest in particular witnessed a large
inux of European migrants in response to the new occupational opportunities that became available.
Historians describe the eorts made by migrant communities to establish \occupational beachheads"
and \toe-holds" in new locations, and to subsequently work hard to maintain these coveted positions
once they were established. We will show that the cost to the network from the exit of one of its
1Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), for example, document the negative relationship between racial fractionalization
and public good provision in the United States.
1members and, hence, eorts to instill a sense of loyalty to the local community would have been
greatest in fractionalized labor markets with many ethnic networks competing for coveted permanent
jobs.
The migrant church was historically central to the maintenance of the ethnic network, providing
a domain in which information could ow, commitments could be enforced, and loyalty to the local
community could be instilled (Gjerde 1991). Outside of the labor market, the church provided other
services to its members as well, including social activity and support when they were sick or inrm.
Labor market networks and civic institutions based on a common European ancestry are largely irrel-
evant in the Midwest today (Gans 1979, Alba 1990). However, it would be incorrect to assume that
these ethnic institutions disappeared without a trace. While the labor market networks might have
disappeared, the church continues to provide important forms of mutual assistance, which require, in
turn, a relatively high level of commitment in terms of time and eort from the congregation. We
expect churches to have made a particular eort to instill a sense of group-loyalty among their mem-
bers in fractionalized markets with competing ethnic groups at the time of initial settlement. Such
loyalty and commitment to the local community would have led, in turn, to well functioning churches.
If members' inputs in the church are complements, as suggested by Iannaccone (1998), and if there is
sucient overlap across generations, then the incumbent members of these well functioning churches
would have had a greater incentive to instill an identity that discouraged geographical mobility in the
generation that followed. This process would have repeated itself from one generation to the next, in
the church and in other institutions that formed around it, linking initial settlement patterns to local
identity or a loyalty to place that is independent of ethnicity today.
Loyalty to place or local identity (Hunter 1975, Guerson, Stueve and Fischer 1977, Hummon 1990)
is well described by the following quote from a resident of Bloomington, Indiana who moved to that
city to live with his wife who was born nearby, \... my chief ambition, I discovered during our early
years in Bloomington, was not to make a good career but to make a good life. And such a life as I
came to understand it, meant being a husband and a father rst, and an employee second; it meant
belonging to a place rather than to a profession ... So as I came to recognize my children's need and
my own need for a rm home place, I came to understand my community's need for citizens who stay
put. Most of what I valued in Bloomington was the result of eorts by people who loved the place,
either because they grew up here and chose to stay, or because they landed here and chose to remain"
(Sanders 2007: 67-68).
2Two aspects of local identity emerge from the preceding quote. First, local identity is associated
with values that stress loyalty to a specic place. As in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we expect that
individuals born and socialized in communities with a strong local identity will incur a utility cost
when they deviate from prescribed behavior and leave their communities. In the U.S. labor market,
this implies that individuals endowed with a strong sense of local identity will be less likely to choose
professional occupations, which are associated with signicantly greater work-related moves than non-
professional occupations. Second, we see that the core value associated with local identity, notably a
commitment to stay, complements local institutions. Strong identity and well functioning institutions
are mutually reinforcing and, as discussed above, one cannot persist without the other (B enabou and
Tirole [2006] make the same argument to explain the persistence of mutually reinforcing collective
beliefs and political equilibria).
The homogenization of production that is characteristic of the Midwest only began around 1880.
Thus, between 1850 and 1880 there was a window of time during which this region was rapidly settled
and during which there was substantial uctuation in labor market conditions and, hence, ethnic rivalry
across local areas. These initial conditions are crucial because once local institutions and a level of
individual commitment were established, these mutually reinforcing eects would have remained in
place over many generations in the future. We consequently exploit variation in initial conditions within
the Midwest to identify the eect of historical networks, and the identity and parochial institutions
they engendered, on occupational choice and geographical mobility long after the networks themselves
had disappeared. The framework we have outlined generates two testable predictions. The rst
prediction is that areas with greater ethnic rivalry at the time of settlement should be associated with
stronger local identity, which implies that individuals born (and socialized) in those areas should be
less likely to enter a more mobile professional career today. The second prediction is that greater ethnic
rivalry should also have given rise to better functioning migrant churches and, hence, greater religious
participation in select denominations historically dominated by the migrants, over many generations
in the future.
To test the rst prediction we combine data from the U.S. census and the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). A major advantage of situating the analysis in the Midwest is that
individual level data on occupations and ethnicity can be obtained from the census going back to
the time when this region was starting to develop. We focus on the 1860 census when rapid growth
was just commencing and construct a measure of ethnic fractionalization, one minus the Herndahl
3concentration index, within each broad occupational category in each county in that census year. Aver-
aging over all occupational categories in each county we arrive at a measure of ethnic fractionalization
in 1860 that we expect is positively correlated with ethnic rivalry in the labor market at that time
and, hence, with the strength of local identity in the county as it subsequently emerged. Matching
the county-level measure of ethnic fractionalization with individual data from the NLSY79, we nd
that individuals born in high fractionalization counties are signicantly less likely to be employed in
professional occupations and are signicantly less likely to have migrated out of their birth county in
2000.
The values that we believe are responsible for the career choices described above could not have
persisted in a local community over so many generations without institutional support. The second
prediction of our framework is that high fractionalization counties should have been associated with
better functioning migrant churches and related parochial institutions. If these institutional features
persisted over time, supporting and being supported by local identity, then we would expect to see
greater participation in religious denominations that were historically dominated by migrants, notably
the Lutherans and the Catholics, today. Using data from the Census of Religious Bodies, available at
roughly ten-year intervals from 1860 to 2000, we successfully verify this important prediction. The share
of Lutherans and Catholics in the population is signicantly larger in high fractionalization counties
by 1870 and, most importantly, this gap grows steadily wider over the course of the twentieth century.
In contrast, participation in other denominations is signicantly lower in the high fractionalization
counties over the entire period.
Our interpretation of these striking results is that local institutions and individual values, de-
termined endogenously by the labor market when the Midwest was rst being settled in 1860, have
subsequently persisted over time and continue to shape occupational choices in the county one hundred
and forty years later. Alternative explanations assume that the ability endowment in the population,
investments in human capital, or access to particular types of jobs today vary with fractionalization
in 1860. For example, although ethnic networks and European ancestry are no longer directly rel-
evant in the Midwest economy, ethnic fractionalization in 1860 could potentially be correlated with
particular features of the economy at that time, which had persistent eects and are correlated with
the demand for professional labor today. Similarly, the well documented negative correlation between
fractionalization and public good provision could have given rise to poorly functioning schools in high
fractionalization counties.
4If identity is salient and the current demand for professional labor is uncorrelated with historical
fractionalization, then we show that there will be a mismatch in the labor market as long as there is ex
ante uncertainty in the demand for dierent types of jobs. High fractionalization counties will supply
too few professionals and too many non-professionals. Professional labor must move into these counties
and non-professional labor must move out of them ex post in competitive equilibrium. It follows that
individuals residing in high fractionalization counties will be just as likely to hold professional jobs as
individuals residing in low fractionalization counties, once the labor market clears. It is only individuals
born in high fractionalization counties who should be less likely to be professionals. The alternative
hypothesis, based on dierences in the demand for professional labor across counties, predicts that
individuals born and residing in high fractionalization counties should be less likely to be professionals.
We will later verify that labor ows systematically with the level of historical fractionalization as
described above and, more importantly, that there is no correlation between occupational choice and
the historical level of ethnic fractionalization in the county of residence, ruling out the most obvious
alternative explanation for our results.
Our results could also be obtained if the incoming migrants in the high fractionalization counties
had lower ability, and this ability dierential persisted across generations. Human capital transmission
is less of a concern with our analysis since we are going back at least ve generations; even if the
ability distribution of the incoming migrants varied systematically with fractionalization in 1860, this
heterogeneity would have long since disappeared, given the high rates of inter-county migration (close
to 60 percent on average) that we document below.2 Moreover, given the dynamic nature of the local
economy at the time of initial settlement, fractionalization was not very persistent; the correlation
between 1860 and 1870 fractionalization is just 0.3 and the correlation between 1860 and 1900 frac-
tionalization is just 0.16. We thus do not expect to nd a strong association between our measure of
fractionalization in 1860 and the local heterogeneity that could have determined formative investments
in the school system many decades later in the twentieth century, as documented by Goldin and Katz
2The empirical strategy that we employ is related to the strategy adopted by Fernandez and Fogli (2007) in a very
interesting recent paper. Fernandez and Fogli establish that female labor force participation in the origin country aects
labor force participation and fertility rates among second-generation female migrants in the United States. They rely
on the assumption that cultural traits will be transmitted across space and so cultural heterogeneity will continue to
manifest itself in an economic environment { the U.S. labor market { that does not distinguish between social groups.
The obvious alternative explanation, which they take care to rule out, is that human capital rather than culture is being
transmitted across generations. With our strategy, the chief concern is that there is something about the place, other
than identity and its complementary institutions, that has persisted over time, which the preceding test on the county of
residence, rather than the county of birth, helps rule out.
5(1999). The NLSY provides information on AFQT scores and educational attainment. Information
on local public good provision, including education expenditures, can also be obtained at the county
level in 1990. As expected, we nd no relationship between historical fractionalization and current
investments in schooling or educational attainment.
Complementing recent studies that investigate the relationship between culture and growth (Barro
and McCleary 2003, Tabellini 2005, Fernandez and Fogli 2007), we nd that local identity and its
accompanying institutions, notably the church, have an important eect on occupational choice. A
one standard deviation decline in 1860 fractionalization would increase the proportion of individuals
holding professional jobs in 2000 from 9 percent to 15 percent. Internal migration clears the labor
market in our U.S. setting and so we do not expect identity to have a substantial eect on local
growth rates. Nevertheless, the fact that non-economic factors have such a large and persistent eect
on important economic choices in a region as homogenous as the American Midwest suggests that
cultural eects may be even stronger across countries with very dierent histories.
2 The Institutional Setting
2.1 The Settling of the Midwest
The Midwest rst began to be settled in the early nineteenth century with the expansion of the national
canal system. The Erie Canal linking the Hudson to Lake Erie was completed in 1825 and numerous
inter-regional and intra-regional canals were built over the next two decades (Fishlow 2000). However,
it was only with the arrival of the railroad that the Midwest took o on a steeper growth trajectory.
Before 1850 the Midwest had less than one thousand miles of track, but almost ten thousand were
added by 1857 (Meyer 1989).
Improved rail transportation stimulated industrialization and the Midwest's share of national man-
ufacturing increased rapidly between 1860 and 1920, with almost half of this increase occurring in the
1860's (Meyer 1989). This increase in economic activity led, in turn, to an increase in the demand for
labor. In 1810, approximately 6 percent of the labor force (outside the southern states) resided in the
Midwest. My 1860, this share had increased to 41 percent, with a further increase to 51 percent by
1880, after which regional growth converged to the national average (Margo 1999).
In this paper, the Midwest is comprised of the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Wisconsin (Missouri, the only pre-Civil War slave state in the Midwest, is excluded from the
6analysis). Using county-level census data we see that the number of incorporated counties increases
sharply from 1850 to 1860 and then attens out by 1880 in Figure 1. Information on railroads,
obtained from the Historical Map Archive at the University of Alabama, indicates that the number of
these counties with a railroad also increases steeply over the 1850-1870 period, growing thereafter at a
slower rate.3 The rapid expansion of the railroad system and the economic activity that accompanied
it led to a steep increase in the population of the Midwest as well as an inux of foreign migrants.
Using county-level census statistics, the total population in our seven Midwestern states grew from
less than 5 million in 1850 to 20 million in 1900. The number of foreign-born migrants nearly tripled
between 1850 and 1860, reaching close to 20 percent of the population.
Where did these migrants come from? Individual-level data, including characteristics such as age,
sex, occupation, and country of birth, are publicly available from the Population Census each decade
from 1850 to 1930. We use the 1-in-100 sample from the 1860-1900 IPUMS to study changes in the
migrant population in these critical early decades in Table 1. The English (13 percent), the Irish (25
percent), and the Germans (32 percent), dominated the migrant population in the Midwest in 1860,
just after the rst wave of migration described above, with no other ethnic group accounting for more
than a 3 percent share of the migrants in that year. Subsequently, the English and the Irish were
displaced by the Germans and the Scandinavians over the 1860-1900 period. Notice that the Italians,
Poles, and Slavs continue to be insignicant in 1900, although they would display a substantial presence
in Midwestern cities such as Cleveland, Chicago, and Pittsburgh by the rst quarter of the twentieth
century.
What jobs did the migrants occupy? Table 2 reports the occupational distribution of the migrants
from the IPUMS sample in 1860, 1880, and 1900. Although agriculture was the dominant sector in
this period, the share of farm employment declines from 62 percent in 1860 to 48 percent in 1900, with
manufacturing operatives and laborers accounting for much of the increase in non-farm employment.
These trends are consistent with the growth of the manufacturing sector described above and they are
similar for the foreign-born migrants and the native workers (not reported).
The apparent similarity in the occupational distribution for migrants and natives masks dierences
in the type of jobs they had access to within each occupational category. Labor markets in the nine-
teenth century could be divided into three segments: a stable segment with permanent employment, an
3Railroad maps were used to construct a county-level binary variable indicating whether any part of a railroad ran
through the county in a given year. Railroad maps were unavailable in some census years in which case we used maps
that were closest in vintage to those census years (the discrepancy never exceeded three years).
7unstable segment with periodic short-term unemployment, and a marginal but highly exible segment
characterized by spells of long-term and short-term employment (Gordon, Edwards, Reich 1982). Mi-
grants being newcomers to the U.S. market typically ended up in the unstable and marginal segments,
where the uncertain labor demand naturally provided an impetus for the formation of ethnic networks
that helped their members nd jobs (Hoerder 1991). We would expect these networks to have been
particularly important during the rapid expansion phase around 1860, with the inux of migrants and
the opening up of new labor markets in both agriculture and manufacturing. The initial conditions
in the empirical analysis, measuring ethnic rivalry in the labor market at the time of settlement, will
consequently be measured using data at this point in time.
2.2 Ethnic Labor Networks in the Midwest
Accounts by contemporary observers and a rich social history literature indicate that friends and
kin from the origin community in Europe played an important role in securing jobs for migrants in
the Midwest in the nineteenth century and the rst quarter of the twentieth century. Early historical
studies used census data, which provides fairly detailed occupational and ethnic information, to identify
ethnic clusters in particular locations and occupations. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) note that
although foreign-born workers comprised just over 20 percent of the labor force in 1870, they accounted
for 43 percent of the iron and steel operatives, 43 percent of the woolen mill workers, and 63 percent
of the miners. Nearly a quarter of railroad workers were Irish, a third of the miners were British, and
about half the workers in the baking and confectionary business were German. While such clustering
suggests that underlying ethnic networks were channelling their members into particular occupations,
it could simply reect the fact that migrants arrived with specic skills. Hutchinson's (1956) analysis
of 1950 census data, however, indicates that clustering continued even among the migrants' children,
with the concentration of particular ethnic groups in some industries actually increasing from the rst
to the second generation.
Although census data are a useful source of information, they do not provide details of the migration
process and its connection to ethnic networks in the United States. Over the past four decades, however,
social historians have linked parish registers and county data in specic European sending communities
to census and church records in the United States to construct the entire chain of migration from those
communities as it unfolded over time. This remarkable research eort has documented the formation
of new settlements in the Midwest by pioneering migrants, the subsequent channelling of migrants
8from the origin community in Europe to these settlements, as well as the movement of groups from the
original settlement to new satellite colonies elsewhere in the United States. As with the census data, this
research identies occupational and geographic clustering, but at a dissagregate level. Over 45 percent
of the Swedish emigrants from the parish of R atvik eventually settled in Isanti County, Minnesota
(Ostergren 1976). Two-thirds of the emigrants from Balestrand located in Norway Grove, Wisconsin
in the rst decade of migration from that Norwegian community (Gjerde 1985). And one-third to one-
half of the German emigrants from Westerkappeln settled in Duden County, Missouri (Kamphoefner
1987). Although less detailed origin-country information is available for southern European migrants,
similar ethnic clustering in particular neighborhoods of Midwestern cities has been documented for
Polish, Italian, and Slovak immigrants from specic sending regions (Alexander 1991, Bodnar, Simon,
and Weber 1982).
A possibly stronger indicator of the importance of migrant networks is the maintenance of ethnic
ties over successive moves within the United States. Italians moved from Southern Illinois to the
\Italian Hill" in St. Louis when coal mining operations were reduced in the 1920's and Slavs moved
from mines in Western Pennsylvania to Detroit's growing automobile industry in the same decade
(Bodnar 1985). Norwegians from Balestrand initially settled in Norway Grove, Wisconsin, but over
time they established six satellite settlements in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois (Gjerde 1985).
A similar pattern has been documented for Norwegians immigrants from Fortun, who initially settled
in Vernon and Crawford Counties, Missouri, but later established satellite communities throughout
the Midwest (Gjerde 1997).
While the preceding descriptions of ethnic clustering are informative, ethnic concentration within
specic departments or rms in a local industry provides possibly the strongest evidence that labor
networks were active. Nearly all three thousand employees of the Peninsular Gas Company in Detroit in
1900 were Polish, and Croatians held only three jobs in Indiana's oil reneries: stillman helper, reman,
and still cleaner (Bodnar 1985). Italians in Pittsburgh's steel industry dominated the carpentry, repair,
and rail shops. And, relying on friends and relatives, Poles established occupational niches at the Jones
and Laughlin and Oliver Mills on Pittsburgh's Southside, Heppenstalls and the Pennsylvania Railroad
in Lawrenceville, and at the Armstrong Cork Company and the H.J. Heinz Plant. As John K. a Polish
immigrant put it, \The only way you got a job [was] through somebody at work who got you in"
(Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982: 56).
What kept ethnic networks in place so far from their origin locations? It has been argued that
9\[migrants] from varying regions [in the origin country] formed a community based on common nation-
ality and religion centered on the central cultural institution { the church" (Gjerde 1991: 176). The
building of a church was one of the rst organized actions in the migrant community once it arrived in
an area (Barton 1975, Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982). Churches provided both economic and social
support to their members. Information about jobs and potential land transactions owed within the
congregation and the church also served as a public arena in which members who had reneged on their
obligations could be sanctioned.
Given the variety of economic opportunities in the United States, individuals and small groups
drawn from the same origin community in Europe often had an incentive to move and seek employment
elsewhere. The stability of the local community in the United States was thus essential for the viability
of the labor market network. One strategy to maintain stability would have been to instill a sense
of loyalty to this community. The discussion that follows will discuss how eorts to engender a sense
of local identity by the church and the institutions that formed around it might have varied across
Midwestern counties when the rst wave of migrants arrived in the region.
2.3 Ethnic Fractionalization Across the Midwest
\You take in the erection department { it was mostly all Slavs ... Not Slovaks, it was Polish ... We
didn't have Lithuanians there and the Russians were not involved there ... Now if a Russian got his
job in a shear department ... he's looking for a buddy, a Russian buddy. He's not going to look for
a Croatian buddy. And if he see the boss looking for a man he says, `Look, I have a good man,' and
he's picking out his friends." (Polish immigrant in Pittsburgh, quoted in Bodnar, Simon, and Weber
1982:62).
Numerous historians have described the eorts made by ethnic groups to establish a \toe-hold"
(Thistlethwaite 1991) or a \beachhead" (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982) in particular industries or
establishments when they rst settled in an area. The preceding quote suggests, in addition, that once
a network had established a presence in the labor market, it was essential to maintain that presence.
The discussion that follows will describe the labor market conditions under which migrant communities
would have had the greatest incentive to restrict exit and, hence, instill a sense of local identity among
their members. An explanation for the persistence of this identity over multiple generations, based on
the complementary role of the church and other related institutions, is postponed to the next section.
Consider a market with N migrant workers drawn from M communities. The number of workers in
10each community is exogenously determined and we do not require the labor market to be in equilibrium.
The workers are competing for a xed number of coveted permanent jobs, which provide a total surplus
R. Tullock's (1980) canonical model of rent seeking can be conveniently adapted to this setting to
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which is increasing in M. Holding N and R constant, an increase in the number of communities
is associated with a greater marginal cost of exit regardless of whether the returns to network size are
increasing ( > 1) or decreasing ( < 1) at the margin. It follows that communities in labor markets
with greater ethnic competition should have invested more in instilling a sense of local identity and in
building well functioning parochial institutions.
To measure ethnic competition we assume that networks were most active in the migrant population
and that they were organized on the basis of the country of origin. Recall that the migrant church
brought individuals from dierent communities in the origin country together into a large and stable
network. Numerous accounts of occupational mobility in the nineteenth century indicate that although
networks supported the movement of their members across establishments and even across industries,
migrants could rarely change the type or skill-level of their jobs. Competition between networks is
consequently assumed to occur within the broad occupational categories specied in Table 2.
Because networks vary in size in practice, we use a standard measure of fractionalization, dened
as one minus the Herndahl index of ethnic concentration, to measure competition.5 The IPUMS
4Tullock's specication is identical to the equation above except that the number of workers is replaced by the
investment in rent seeking.
5The Herndahl index of ethnic concentration is computed as the sum of the squared share of each ethnicity in the
occupational category. It is easy to verify that for the special case with networks of equal size, the fractionalization
measure is equal to 1   N
2=M, which is increasing in the number of communities M, for a given number of migrant
workers N, as above.
11provides the country of birth and the occupation (where relevant) for each sampled individual. Using
these data, we compute ethnic fractionalization in each occupational category in each Midwest county
in 1860. The weighted average of the occupation-specic statistics, where the weight is measured by the
share of migrants in the occupation, then provides us with an overall measure of ethnic fractionalization
in the county. Figure 2 plots the fractionalization measure, which has a mean of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.2, across the seven Midwest states. Counties that were not incorporated and those
without foreign-born migrants in 1860 are unshaded in the Figure. Although there is substantial
variation in the fractionalization measure, which is useful for the statistical tests that follow, no spatial
clustering is evident in Figure 2.
While we focus on the eect of ethnic fractionalization in strengthening within-group solidarity,
fractionalization could at the same time undermine the functioning of secular institutions. Public ser-
vices were provided at a rudimentary level in 1860 and the rst investments in secondary schooling,
for example, occurred more than 50 years later (Goldin and Katz 1999). Given the weak serial corre-
lation in the fractionalization variable, we do not expect 1860 fractionalization to have been strongly
correlated with heterogeneity in the community many decades later, when it may have mattered for
the provision of local public goods. As expected, ethnic fractionalization in 1860 will be shown to
be uncorrelated with ethnic (and racial) fractionalization in 1990. We will also verify that 1860 frac-
tionalization is uncorrelated with local public good provision, including education expenditures, in
1990.
2.4 Historical Fractionalization and Current Economic Conditions
To test the hypothesis that local identity and its complementary parochial institutions shape career
choices, fractionalization must be uncorrelated with the demand for professionals, intrinsic ability in
the population, and local public good provision. We show in this section that ethnic fractionalization
in 1860 is uncorrelated with measures of economic activity, racial and ethnic fractionalization, and
expenditures on local public goods in 1990 once a few important characteristics of the 1860 economy
are controlled for. More stringent tests ruling out a link between 1860 fractionalization and current
economic conditions are discussed in Section 5.
Ethnic labor networks are no longer active in the American Midwest. Nevertheless, fractionalization
in 1860 could have been correlated with particular features of the economy at the time of initial
settlement that had persistent eects. To explore this possibility, we proceed to understand what
12determined fractionalization in the rst place. In a rapidly expanding Midwest economy, some of
the variation in fractionalization across counties was no doubt a consequence of accidental initial
settlement by ethnic groups in particular locations, which fueled the arrival of more migrants as
networks crystallized. At the same time, fractionalization would have been determined by the demand
for labor, with more ethnic groups attracted to rapidly growing areas. We have already discussed
the importance of transportation links in the development of the Midwest and Table 3 consequently
investigates the eect of railroads and distance to canals and a Great Lakes harbor on fractionalization
in 1860.6 Counties with a railroad running through them and counties that are closer to a canal or
harbor have signicantly higher fractionalization in Table 3, Column 1. Counties close to a harbor had
a greater proportion of the workforce engaged in manufacturing and a smaller proportion in agriculture
in 1860 in Table 3, Columns 2-3. Improved transportation, more generally, is associated with a larger
population in 1860 in Column 4.
Notice that the pattern of coecients in Table 3, Column 1 with fractionalization as the dependent
variable matches perfectly with the corresponding pattern in Column 4 with county population as the
dependent variable. Counties with superior transportation infrastructure, which were more populated
and presumably growing more rapidly, were more fractionalized in 1860. The population of the county
in 1860 could have determined subsequent agglomeration in economic activity, with long-term implica-
tions for the growth of the local economy. Not surprisingly, we see in Table 4, Columns 1-3 that while
1860 fractionalization has an insignicant eect on 1990 agriculture share and manufacturing share, it
is signicantly and positively associated with current county population as well as population density
(not reported). More urban counties will be more racially and ethnically diverse, and it follows that
1860 fractionalization is signicantly and positively correlated with racial fractionalization in 1990 in
Column 5.7
We expect the fractionalization eect to disappear once important features of the local economy
that would directly determine economic activity today, such as manufacturing share, agriculture share,
6Data on the distance to the nearest canal (or navigable river) and the nearest Great Lakes harbor is obtained from
Jordan Rappaport's website at the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank. The distance is computed in each case from the
county centroid.
7The manufacturing share in 1990 is dened as the share of the civilian labor force employed in manufacturing in that
year. The agriculture share in 1990 is computed using the farm population and the total population in the county in that
year. All these statistics, as well as the area of each county used to compute the population density, are obtained from
the 1994 County Data Book, compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Racial fractionalization is computed from the
1990 IPUMS as one minus the Herndahl index of racial concentration, using the same ve racial groups as in Alesina,
Baqir, and Hoxby (2004). Ethnic fractionalization is computed from the 1990 IPUMS as one minus the Herndahl index
of racial concentration, using the same 16 white ethnic groups as in Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby.
13and particularly population in 1860, are accounted for. The fractionalization coecient is indeed small
and insignicant in Columns 7-11 of Table 4, once the county controls are included. In contrast,
agricultural counties in 1860 continue to be agricultural in 1990 and more populated counties in 1860
remain larger in 1990. Notice, however, that manufacturing in 1860 does not have a persistent eect.
Although the factory system began to replace artisan shops by 1820, production continued to be
largely organized in workshops managed by labor contractors who hired their own employees until
1870 (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). The heavy manufacturing that characterized the Midwest
economy in the twentieth century, with its emphasis on the iron and steel industry, only came at the
turn of the century (Meyer 1989). Recently it has been argued that the surge of foreign immigration
in the second half of the nineteenth century provided the impetus for the factory system and the
subsequent industrialization of the Midwest (Kim 2007). Whatever the explanation, it is clear that
the pattern of manufacturing around 1860, spread throughout the Midwest in small towns, had little
connection with the heavy manufacturing, concentrated in large cities, that followed in the twentieth
century. This is presumably why 1860 characteristics have such little power in predicting the share of
manufacturing in the county in 1990.
For our purpose, what is important is that once we control for a few features of the nineteenth
century economy, fractionalization in 1860 has no eect on characteristics of the economy today, such as
the share of manufacturing and urbanization (measured by total population or by population density),
that are associated with the demand for professional labor. All of the regressions that follow will
consequently include these important features of the 1860 economy as controls. Notice, however,
that more ethnically fractionalized counties in 1860 have signicantly lower religious fractionalization
in 1990, with and without the controls in Column 6 and Column 12.8 This result, which stands
conspicuously apart from the other regressions reported in Table 4 will be claried in the discussion
on the church and the persistence of identity that follows in Section 3.
We complete this section by describing the relationship between local public good provision in 1990
and ethnic fractionalization in 1860 in Table 5. Local government expenditures per capita in 1990 are
regressed on ethnic fractionalization, manufacturing share, agriculture share, and county population
in 1860 in Column 1. Retaining the same set of regressors, the dependent variable is the share of
expenditure allocated to education, health, police, roads, and welfare in Columns 2-6.9 The expenditure
8Religious fractionalization is computed from the 1990 Census of Religious Bodies as one minus the Herndahl index
of religious concentration, using the same 18 religious denominations as in Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004).
9These data are obtained from the Annual Survey of Governments, 1990. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) use data
14shares for these ve public goods add up to 0.79, with the education share being as large as 0.6. The
other shares range from 0.03 to 0.07. Given that the standard deviation of the fractionalization variable
is 0.2, it is evident from the point estimates that 1860 fractionalization has a negligible eect on public
good provision today. Using the same shares, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) document a negative
and signicant relationship between contemporaneous racial fractionalization and the allocation of
resources to certain public goods, particularly education, roads, and welfare. We have already shown
that 1860 ethnic fractionalization is uncorrelated with 1990 racial fractionalization in Table 4, and
not surprisingly we see in Table 5 that historical ethnic fractionalization has no eect on current local
public good provision, including education expenditures.
3 The Church and the Persistence of Identity
In a recent paper, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) describe how rms and other economic organizations
can instill a sense of identity or loyalty among their workers to solve agency problems. In our setting,
the natural organization to instill loyalty in the community would have been the local church. The
church was among the rst institutions to be established when immigrants arrived in an area (Hoerder
1991, Barton 1975, Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982). The church congregation provided many forms
of mutual assistance including credit, insurance, job referrals, business information, and social support
(Gjerde 1985, 1997, Alexander 1991). Indeed, it has been argued that immigrants participated in
church communities to benet from these economic and social services, instead of being drawn to the
church by a particular belief or ideology (Bodnar 1985).
Despite these material attractions, exit from the church and the local labor market was always a
threat in nineteenth century America, especially in areas that had been recently settled. There was a
tension between a \folk society" centered around the church parish and a competitive \individualistic
society" with its many opportunities (Ostergren 1976). In addition, migration to the United States,
and subsequent internal migration, was often organized under the auspices of relatively small commu-
nities from the origin country. These migrant networks were too small to maintain a viable church
congregation and labor network when they rst arrived in an area and so churches in the Midwest
typically brought together many regional groups with the same national origin. Inter-regional conict
was common, and there was always the possibility that groups within the church would move again
to take advantage of new opportunities that became available elsewhere (Gjerde 1997). Under these
drawn from the same source.
15circumstances, the church had to make a special (costly) eort to instill a sense of loyalty to the local
community among its members that transcended individual, kin, and regional aliations.
If local identity played a role in reducing exit in the nineteenth century, how and why did it
persist long after the ethnic labor networks it supported ceased to be salient? Our explanation for this
persistence is based on the observation that churches continue to provide important forms of social
support to their members. Church activities include Sunday school service, youth groups, pot-lucks,
informal home parties, and food, visits, and other forms of support when members of the congregation
are ailing or inrm. The church also lies at the center of a cluster of inter-linked civic institutions,
including the school and various voluntary organizations. Life in a Midwest community revolves around
these institutions, which bring families and multiple generations together on a regular basis (Elder
and Conger 2000). We focus on the church in the analysis that follows with the understanding that
individuals participate in and benet from a wider range of related institutions; well functioning
churches will in general be associated with tight-knit well functioning communities.10
There are complementarities associated with church inputs; if the rest of the congregation commits
time and eort to the church, then the returns to the individual's inputs would increase as well
(Iannaccone 1998). The presence of these complementarities introduces two problems. First, self-
interested individuals will devote a level of inputs that is sub-optimal because they do not internalize
the benets that the rest of the congregation derives from their actions. Second, a coordination
problem can arise since individuals will only make career choices that are associated with a high level
of commitment to the church if they expect other members of their generation, who are simultaneously
making these choices, to do likewise. A strong sense of local identity reduces each of these problems,
serving as a commitment device and increasing the level of church inputs in equilibrium. Given that
church inputs are complements, it is easy to verify that the older generation in a church with a
committed congregation will be more willing to bear the cost of instilling a strong sense of local
identity in the generation that follows, resulting in a higher level of inputs. Local identity and church
inputs can reinforce each other in this way over many overlapping generations.11
10The number of civic and social associations in the county and the corresponding number of religious organizations
can be obtained from the County Business Patterns, 1990. The number of not-for-prot organizations in the county
can be obtained from National Center for Charitable Statistics Core Files, 1990. Controlling for manufacturing share,
agriculture share, and county population in 1860, ethnic fractionalization in that year has no eect on any of these
variables. Note, however, that these statistics are based on the number of organizations, whereas what we require are
measures of participation. For example, we will see below that 1860 fractionalization has a signicant and positive eect
on religious participation in 1990 despite the fact that it is uncorrelated with the number of religious organizations.
11The persistence in local identity that we describe is related to a paper by B enabou and Tirole (2006) linking invest-
16Local identity and church inputs cannot be observed directly. However, we do observe the num-
ber of church participants across counties and over time. Assuming heterogeneity in the payo from
non-participation in the population, it follows that well functioning churches will have larger congre-
gations. The testable prediction from the preceding discussion is that high fractionalization counties
should begin with stronger local identity, a higher level of church inputs and, hence, greater church
participation at the time of settlement. More importantly, the eect of fractionalization on church
participation should grow over time, reecting the underlying divergence in church performance that is
necessary to sustain dierences in local identity. This prediction distinguished our model, with identity
as a commitment device, from the model of religious cults proposed by Iannaccone (1992) in which
self-sacrice and strict norms of behavior are used to screen out free-riders and ensure higher levels of
participation among those that remain. While this alternative mechanism may induce high levels of
participation at the intensive margin, it results in small congregations and is typically short-lived.
Up to this point we have not distinguished between dierent religious denominations. Based on
the country of origin of the incoming migrants, reported in Table 1, most of the migrant churches
would have been Lutheran or Catholic. Regressing the population-share of dierent denominations,
computed with data from the Census of Religious Bodies in 1860, on the share of migrants in that
year, counties with a greater share of migrants are indeed disproportionately Lutheran and Catholic. A
strong test of our framework, which relies on the role of migrant churches in shaping and maintaining
local identity, is that the predictions derived above should apply to those migrant denominations only.
In particular, higher fractionalization counties should be associated with a greater share of Lutherans
and Catholics in the population around the time of initial settlement and this eect of fractionalization
should grow stronger over time. In contrast, the model has no prediction for the relationship between
fractionalization and participation in other denominations, providing us with a useful falsication
test.12
ments in human capital at the household level with the political equilibrium at the macro level. In their model, children
choose a level of eort (schooling) based on their belief about the returns to this eort. If a suciently large number
of households invest in eort, they will form a pivotal voting block and set a low tax rate, generating, in turn, a high
return to eort that reinforces the initial beliefs. Thus, two political equilibria can arise; a low-eort equilibrium with
substantial redistribution (high taxes) and a high-eort equilibrium with little redistribution (low taxes). B enabou and
Tirole x the equilibrium by assuming that children have imperfect willpower and so will underinvest in eort if left to
themselves. Their parents, who provide them with information about the returns to eort, will consequently systemati-
cally inate these returns. This \ideological" position leads parents in the high-eort equilibrium to (optimally) ignore
negative signals about the returns to eort, allowing particular equilibria and the collective beliefs that support them to
persist over many generations. In this paper we use local identity rather than ideology to x the level of church inputs
and sustain a social equilibrium over many generations.
12The implicit assumption underlying these predictions is that the mapping from church inputs to participation should
17The relationship between ethnic fractionalization and religious participation can be tested with data
from the Census of Religious Bodies (CRB), which has been conducted at roughly ten-year intervals
from 1860 to 2000. This census was conducted as part of the population census from 1860 to 1890,
with census enumerators collecting information from individual churches in each county. Subsequently,
the U.S. Bureau of the Census conducted the CRB separately from the population census in 1906,
1916, 1926, and 1936. Starting from 1952, the National Council of Churches of Christ undertook the
responsibility of conducting the CRB, with subsequent census rounds in 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
The 1860-1890 census rounds collected information on the number of church seats by denomination
in each county. From 1890 onwards, information was collected on the number of members directly,
and from 1972 onwards the number of adherents was collected as well. Despite these changes in the
management of the CRB and the measure of religious participation, we uncover clear changes in the
mix of denominations as well as the eect of 1860 fractionalization on religious participation over time.
Table 6 reports changes in the mix of denominations and overall participation rates in our Midwest-
ern counties over the 1860-2000 period. To take account of the fact that the measure of participation
was changing over time, we report statistics in the rst and the last census-year that each measure was
used. Thus, participation is measured by the number of church seats from 1860 to 1890, by the number
of members from 1890 to 1952, and by the number of adherents from 1972 to 2000.13 The participation
rate is then computed as the number of participants divided by the contemporaneous population in the
county. Five denominations { Baptist, Catholic, Lutheran, Methodist, and Presbyterian { account for
roughly 80 percent of church participants over the 1860-2000 period. Among these denominations, the
Lutherans grow rapidly in popularity over the 1860-1890 period and the 1890-1952 period, remaining
stable thereafter. In contrast, the Methodists and the Presbyterians decline steadily over time. There
is no clear trend among the Baptists and the Catholics.
The inability of the Baptist church to increase its share of church participants contrasts with the
surge in popularity of this denomination elsewhere in the United States, as documented by Finke
and Stark (1992). The Midwest stands apart from the rest of the country in that the \traditional"
not vary with fractionalization. Fractionalization in 1860 was correlated with characteristics of the local economy at
that time and, hence, with the characteristics of the incoming migrants, potentially violating this assumption. Given
the dynamic nature of the economy at the time of initial settlement, however, 1860 fractionalization would soon have
been uncorrelated with population characteristics and we expect the predictions for participation to hold up within a few
decades of 1860.
13Although the number of members was also collected in the 1972-2000 census rounds, this statistic is not available for
Catholics, a major denomination in our Midwestern counties, in these rounds.
18denominations, particularly the Catholics and the Lutherans, continue to dominate and we will connect
this observation to the link between migrants churches, local identity, and religious participation below.
Even without the Baptist surge, religious participation increased steadily over time in the Midwest,
rising over the 1860-1890 and 1890-1952 periods. Based on the statistics in the most recent 1972-2000
period, 55-60 percent of the population in our Midwestern counties are church adherents.
We now proceed to estimate the relationship between ethnic fractionalization in 1860 and religious
participation in the county in each round of the CRB. The religious participation regression includes the
same set of county-level controls as the regressions in Table 4, Columns 7-12 and Table 5. Because the
regression is estimated over many census years, we simply report the 1860 fractionalization coecient,
together with the 95 percent condence band, in each census year in Figure 3. This coecient is less
precisely estimated in the early census years, but grows steadily larger, while remaining statistically
signicant, all the way through to 2000.14
A stronger test of our framework is that its predictions should only apply to participation in
migrant denominations. We consequently proceed to estimate two separate regressions in each census
year; the rst regression has the share of Lutherans and Catholics in the population as the dependent
variable and the second regression has the share of all other denominations as the dependent variable.
The 1860 fractionalization coecient, with the corresponding 95 percent condence band, is reported
for each regression in each census year in Figure 4. We now see that the share of Lutherans and
Catholics in the population is signicantly greater in high fractionalization counties by 1870 and that
the fractionalization eect gets steadily larger over time, as predicted. Although we do not report
results separately by denomination, this pattern is obtained for both the Catholics and the Lutherans.
A one standard deviation decline in 1860 fractionalization would increase the population share of
Lutherans and Catholics in the county by four percentage points (22 percent) in 2000. In contrast,
the fractionalization coecient is negative and signicant, and very stable over time, in the companion
regression. These results, taken together, provide a simple explanation for the negative correlation
14The 1860 fractionalization coecient with standard error in parentheses is -0.66(0.39). This outlying coecient is
omitted from Figure 3 and Figure 4 that follows to clarify changes in the fractionalization coecient over time. As
noted, church seats and the number of members are both available in the 1890 CRB. We use the rst statistic to measure
church participation in Figure 3 and Figure 4 because it is more in line with trends in the fractionalization coecient
over time. Although not reported, the coecient on 1860 agriculture share is also positive and signicant in the religious
participation regressions and grows larger over time. Unlike ethnic fractionalization, which soon ceased to be directly
relevant, recall from Table 4 that agricultural counties in 1860 remained disproportionately agricultural in 1990. It is
well known that farming communities tend to be more religious and community-oriented and so the persistent eect of
the 1860 agriculture share may simply reect the persistence of agricultural activity in particular areas over time.
19between ethnic fractionalization in 1860 and religious fractionalization in 1990 that we reported in
Table 4.
Our explanation for the pattern in Figure 4 for the migrant denominations is that the gap in
church inputs between low and high fractionalization counties is widening over time, giving rise to an
accompanying increase in the participation-gap. An alternative explanation for this pattern is that
there are increasing returns to scale in church performance; Lutheran and Catholic churches were large
to begin with in the high fractionalization counties and grew larger over time. The time-trend in the
fractionalization coecient for the migrant and non-migrant denominations in Figure 4 would appear
to rule out this explanation; we should otherwise have observed a (symmetric) declining trend for
the non-migrant denominations. Nevertheless, we experimented with augmented specications that
included (i) the share of Lutherans and Catholics, and (ii) a full set of 32 ethnic shares (which sum
up to the share of migrants in the population), in 1860 by county, as regressors. The initial share of
Lutherans and Catholics, as well as some of the ethnic shares do have persistent eects. However,
the fractionalization coecient remains stable over the course of the twentieth century with both the
augmented specications. The strong and persistent relationship between 1860 fractionalization and
church participation contrasts with the absence of any eect of this variable on current economic
conditions in Table 4 and Table 5, once particular features of the local economy are controlled for.15
We cannot observe local identity, but to the extent that well functioning churches require committed
congregations, this result sets the stage for the analysis of occupational choice with local identity that
follows.
4 Occupational Choice with Local Identity
If local identity shapes occupational choice and fractionalization is uncorrelated with the demand for
professional labor, then individuals born in high fractionalization counties should be less likely to choose
professional careers but individuals subsequently residing in those countries should be as likely to be
professionals once the market clears. The model developed in this section and described in greater
detail in the Appendix derives this joint hypothesis more formally. It also explains why individuals
born in high fractionalization counties would shade their choices towards less mobile non-professional
occupations, giving rise to a surplus of non-professional labor in those counties on average, even though
15The pattern of coecients reported in Figure 4 would also be obtained if the county controls were omitted from the
participation regression, although the point estimates would actually be somewhat smaller.
20the labor market must ultimately clear. The key insight is that this result will be obtained as long as
there is ex ante uncertainty in the demand for dierent types of jobs across locations.
The model is set up so that two types of jobs are available: professional and non-professional.
Individuals who are ex ante identical live for two periods, working in the second period of their lives.
Those individuals who choose to occupy more productive professional jobs must invest in training in
the rst period of their lives. Individuals who expect to end up in non-professional jobs incur no such
cost. There are two locations in this economy with N individuals born in each location in each period.
On average, sN professional jobs and (1   s)N non-professional jobs are demanded in each location
in each period. However, these locations also face positive and negative demand shocks with equal
probability, which separately shift the demand for professional and non-professional labor by sN and
(1   s)N respectively, but leave the total number of professional jobs 2sN and non-professional jobs
2(1   s)N constant across the two locations in all periods.16
Once demand shocks are introduced, labor must ow across locations at the beginning of each period
to clear the market. In addition, we assume that professional jobs have an individual-specic component
to them. The opportunity to enhance overall productivity by switching a professional working in a
particular location with a professional working in the other location arrives with probability P in each
period. This additional dimension of mobility in professional occupations is based on the idea that
the labor market for a school teacher or a secretary tends to be local. In contrast, professionals such
as university professors or management consultants are continually re-sorting across local and regional
labor markets as new opportunities arise and fresh cohorts of workers enter. A professional can advance
her career considerably with such a move if it becomes available and we will later see that professionals
are indeed much more likely to migrate from their county of birth.
Individuals dislike moving, particularly those with a strong local identity. Let the cost of moving be
C1 for individuals born in location 1 and C2 < C1 for individuals born in location 2 with weaker local
identity. This is the only dierence between workers in the two locations. We assume that all workers
are employed and that professional workers always take advantage of the productivity enhancing career
opportunities when they arise, in which case total output in this economy remains constant across all
states of the world. Although wages for professionals and non-professionals will adjust across the
two locations to clear the labor market in practice, the competitive labor allocation can in that case
16Within a location, demand shocks for professionals and non-professionals could be positively or negatively correlated.
We could also allow the size of the shocks to vary,  for the professionals and  for the non-professionals, without changing
the results reported below.
21be conveniently derived as the solution to the Central Planner's problem of minimizing training and
moving costs across both locations.
Let the supply of professional labor in location 1 be x1. We show in the Appendix that expected
cost is a piece-wise linear function of x1, as described in Figure 5, which is minimized at x
1 = sN  sN
for P < 1=2(C1+C2)=(C1 C2) and at x
1 = sN  sN  N(1 2s) for P > 1=2(C1+C2)=(C1 C2).
The equilibrium supply of professional labor in location 1, with stronger local identity, falls short of
the expected demand sN for all values of P. Moreover, the share of professionals supplied by location
1 is strictly less than the corresponding share in location 2.17
The intuition for this result is that as long as there is ex ante uncertainty in the type of jobs
demanded, some individuals will have to move in both locations with positive probability to clear the
market. By allocating a surplus of non-professionals to location 1, the Central Planner increases the
probability of such moves, but trades this o against the lower probability of having individuals born
in location 1 move ex post on the job.18 We show in the Appendix that the supply of professionals
in location 1 could also fall short of the expected demand without uncertainty, but only if P >
(C1 + C2)=(C1   C2).
In our set up, individuals born in location 1 are less likely to be professionals because they incur
a greater cost when they move (C1 > C2). However, this result could also be obtained if C1 = C2
and the demand for professional labor is lower in location 1, s1N < s2N. The second prediction of
the model, which allows us to rule out this alternative demand-side explanation, is that once the labor
market has cleared, the share of professionals residing in the two locations should on average be the
same (sN). In contrast, if the demand for professional labor is lower in location 1, then individuals
born and subsequently residing in that location should be less likely to be professionals.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Individual Data
To test the predictions from the previous section we need information on the individual's career choice,
county of birth, and county of residence (post-employment). The National Longitudinal Survey of
17For P < 1=2(C1 + C2)=(C1   C2), the share of professionals is s   s in location 1 and s + s in location 2. For
P > 1=2(C1 + C2)=(C1   C2), the corresponding shares are s   (1   s) and s + (1   s).
18The Central Planner could make adjustments on other dimensions as well, by allowing for some level of unemployment
or by letting professionals born in location 1 forego career opportunities with nite probability. The ex ante career choices
that we are interested in would nevertheless continue to vary systematically across locations as described.
22Youth 1979 (NLSY79) is the only large-scale data set that we are aware of that includes this informa-
tion. The NLSY consists of a nationally representative sample of American high school seniors in 1979
who were subsequently interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially thereafter. The survey
collects basic information on the respondent's age, gender, race and, most importantly, county of birth.
The Armed Forces Qualication Test (AFQT), which is designed to provide an unbiased measure of
the individual's intelligence, was administered to all respondents in 1979. Subsequent survey rounds
collected contemporaneous information on educational attainment, employment, occupation, income,
and county of residence. We will study occupational choice and other outcomes related to that eco-
nomic decision at two points in time { 1994 and 2000 { when the respondents were old enough to be
settled in their careers and to have made some job-related moves. Occupational choices from the NLSY
in these years will be matched to census data on historical fractionalization, both in the individual's
county of birth and the contemporaneous county of residence, to test the predictions of the model.
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for the individuals in our sample, who were on average 18 years
old in 1979 and so around 33 years old in 1994 and 39 years old in 2000. Occupational categories in the
NLSY (up to the 2000 round) are based on the 1970 codes from the census. Professional occupations
are dened to include relevant codes listed under the Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers
category [1-196]. Job-related geographical mobility is the chief property that distinguishes professional
and non-professional occupations in our model. We consequently exclude technical occupations and
other occupations where career moves are unlikely to be important from this category.19
Based on this occupational classication, 9 percent of the respondents hold professional jobs, with
little change from 1994 to 2000. 56 percent of all respondents had migrated out of their birth-county
by 1994, with an increase to 59 percent by 2000. Consistent with the assumption that professional
occupations are associated with greater mobility, 75 percent of the professionals and 53 percent of the
non-professionals had migrated out of their birth-county by 1994 (these dierences are signicant at
the 5 percent level and similar in 1994 and 2000).
Individuals in the sample are 33 years old by 1994 and should be established in the labor market.
Nevertheless, employment levels continue to increase over time, from 81 percent in 1994 to 92 percent in
2000. Conditional on being employed, annual income (in 2000 dollars) also increases from 28 thousand
in 1994 to 33 thousand in 2000. These changes in employment and income are presumably life-cycle
19These occupations include Nurses, dieticians, and therapists [74-76], Religious workers [86,90], Social and recre-
ation workers [100,101], Teachers, except college and university [141-145], Technicians [150-174], Writers, artists, and
entertainers [175-196].
23eects, but they could, in principle, be due to selective attrition since this is a longitudinal survey.
Notice, however, that racial composition and the proportion of women in the sample are very stable
over the 1994-2000 period. Thus, we do not observe selective attrition from the sample, at least with
respect to two important demographic characteristics that are associated with income and employment.
5.2 Fractionalization in the County of Birth and Occupational Choice
The rst prediction from the model of occupational choice incorporating local identity is that indi-
viduals born in counties with greater ethnic fractionalization in 1860 should be less likely to hold
professional jobs. Including race, gender, and age as regressors (although their omission would not
aect the results) we see in Table 8, Columns 1-2 that individuals born in high fractionalization coun-
ties are indeed less likely to hold professional jobs in the 1994 and 2000 rounds of the NLSY. The
individuals in our sample are drawn from 150 of the approximately 400 Midwestern counties that
were incorporated and had attracted foreign migrants by 1860. While it thus seems unlikely that a
few outlying counties are driving the results, we nevertheless report nonparametric estimates of the
relationship between occupational choice and historical fractionalization in Figure 6. We see that the
probability that the individual is a professional declines steadily with fractionalization, both in 1994
and in 2000, verifying the robustness of our results.20
Our test of the hypothesis that identity shapes occupational choice relies on the assumption that
fractionalization is uncorrelated with the demand for professional workers in the county. Recall from Ta-
ble 4, however, that historical fractionalization had a positive and signicant eect on current economic
characteristics, measured by population in the county as well as racial and ethnic fractionalization,
but that this eect disappeared once important characteristics of the 1860 economy were included as
regressors. More urban counties will have a greater demand for professional workers, shifting up the
coecient on the fractionalization variable in Table 8, Columns 1-2. The regressions that follow will
thus include the same 1860 characteristics as in Tables 4 and 5 { population, manufacturing share and
agriculture share { to control for variation in the demand for professional workers across counties.
The prediction that high fractionalization counties should supply fewer professional workers is de-
rived conditional on the total surplus that was historically available to migrants in the labor market
20The nonparametric regressions are estimated using the Epanechnikov kernel smoothing function. Less than 5 percent
of the observations in Table 8, Columns 1-2 are drawn from counties with fractionalization below 0.45 and so too much
weight should not be placed on the extremely steep initial decline in Figure 6. Although all the parametric regressions
that follow will use the full set of counties, we veried that the fractionalization coecient is unchanged when the sample
is restricted to individuals drawn from counties in the 0.45-0.8 range.
24R and the total number of migrant workers N. Everything else equal, an increase in R would increase
the cost of exit at the margin, encouraging eorts to instill local identity historically and lowering
the propensity to enter professional occupations today. Superior transportation infrastructure in 1860
was associated with high fractionalization and a larger county population in Table 3 and so we expect
fractionalization to be positively correlated with R. It follows that exclusion of R from the occupa-
tion choice regression in Table 8, Columns 1-2 would have shifted the coecient on fractionalization
down. The same 1860 characteristics that we described above could be used to control for R, but since
the professional demand eect and the surplus eect work in opposite directions, the eect of their
inclusion on the fractionalization coecient would now be ambiguous. By the same argument, we can
no longer predict the sign of the coecients on the 1860 characteristics when they are included in
the occupation choice regression. For example, larger 1860 population is associated with urbanization
today and, hence, an increased demand for professional jobs. At the same time, a larger 1860 pop-
ulation is associated with a larger R, stronger identity and, hence, a reduced supply of professional
workers. Finally, we would want to account for the number of migrants N when estimating the eect of
fractionalization on occupational choice. This variable is highly correlated with county population (the
correlation is 0.9) and so will be omitted from the regressions that follow. 1860 population captures
the professional demand eect, the surplus eect, and the eect of N on occupational choice.
We see in Table 8, Columns 3-4 that the coecient on 1860 fractionalization becomes more neg-
ative and is more precisely estimated once the additional county-level controls are included in the
occupational choice regressions. To allow for the possibility that individuals with particular ethnic
ancestry continue to be concentrated in specic occupations today, we include the population share
of each ethnicity in the 1860 census, computed at the level of the county, in Columns 5-6. Given
the high rate of inter-county migration, we do not expect the ethnic shares in 1860 to be relevant
today and not surprisingly the fractionalization coecient is hardly aected by the inclusion of these
additional regressors. Based on the estimates in Column 4, a one standard deviation decline in ethnic
fractionalization would increase the probability of holding a professional job from 9 percent to as much
as 15 percent. Individuals born in counties with a greater share of manufacturing and agricultural
jobs in 1860 are also less likely to hold professional jobs. Population in 1860, in contrast, has no eect
on occupational choice in both the 1994 and the 2000 rounds. Finally, women and non-whites are
signicantly less likely to hold professional jobs in Columns 1-6.
We complete the description of the occupational choice regressions by discussing a number of
25robustness tests (not reported). First, we computed ethnic fractionalization in 1860 with men only.
Both men and women participated in the workforce in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with
ethnic networks channeling women into jobs as well. Bodnar (1980), for example, cites a 1930 study of
two thousand foreign-born women, most of whom reported that they had secured their rst job through
social connections. Nevertheless, we might expect labor networks to have been organized along gender
lines within ethnic groups, with male networks occupying a dominant position in the labor market and
in the communities they were drawn from. The coecient on the alternative fractionalization measure
(computed using men alone) continues to be negative and signicant, both in 1994 and 2000, although
it is smaller in size.
Inspection of the occupation categories in Table 2 indicates that farmers made up 50 percent of
the workforce in 1860. Ethnic competition may have been less relevant in this category and so we
recomputed the county-level fractionalization statistic placing zero weight on fractionalization among
the farmers as a second robustness test.21 The fractionalization coecient becomes slightly larger in
absolute magnitude and is more precisely estimated, both with and without the 1860 controls. In a
related exercise, we explored the possibility that ethnic competition occurred outside the labor market
entirely by computing fractionalization without regard to occupational category or occupational status.
This alternative measure of fractionalization, in contrast, had an insignicant eect on occupational
choice.
As a third test, we separately replaced 1860 characteristics with 1850 and 1870 characteristics to
assess the stability of the results in other census years around the time of initial settlement. The
coecient on 1850 fractionalization is negative and signicant, albeit smaller in magnitude. The
coecient on 1870 fractionalization is also negative, but not signicant at conventional levels. Although
we focus on economic characteristics at the time of initial settlement in this paper, we do not rule out
the possibility that relevant measures of population heterogeneity and other economic characteristics
later on had persistent eects as well. All that we require is that 1860 fractionalization should have
a direct and independent eect on identity and church inputs today. The clean trend in the church
21We include all individuals who report being employed, regardless of their age, when computing the fractionalization
statistic since there were no age restrictions on employment at that time. Apart from the 11 broad occupational categories
in Table 2, some individuals in the census were also assigned to an undened occupational category. Women were
disproportionately represented in this category, which presumably covers home production and other informal activities.
As with the farmers, we assume that networks were less relevant in this category and assign it zero weight when computing
ethnic fractionalization in all the regressions that we report. Nevertheless, we veried that assigning a weight to this
category based on its share of the migrant workforce in the county had no eect on the estimated fractionalization
coecient in the occupational choice regression.
26participation regressions reported in Figure 4, starting from 1870 and stretching uninterrupted all the
way through to 2000, provides strong support for this claim.
Fourth, we replaced total population with the migrant population and, separately, with the work-
force, in the occupational choice regression. These variables are all highly correlated, and not surpris-
ingly the results were unchanged. Fifth, we included the share of migrants in the workforce, and the
interaction of this variable with ethnic fractionalization, as additional regressors. This specication
allows for the possibility that ethnic fractionalization had a larger eect in counties where migrants
made up a larger share of the total population. However, both these variables had an insignicant
eect on occupational choice, leaving the (uninteracted) fractionalization coecient unchanged.
Sixth, we expanded the set of professional occupations by including individuals assigned to the
\managers and administrators" code [245] within the broader Managers and Administrators, except
Farm category [201-245]. Most of the specic occupations listed in this broad category do not conform
to our denition of a professional occupation and the \managers and administrators" classication does
not provide much information on the actual nature of jobs that it covers. However, 74.7 percent of the
individuals assigned to that category migrated out of the county of their birth, which is close to the
level of migration for the other occupations that we include in the professional category. Inclusion of
the managers and administrators in the professional classication increased the share of professionals
in the sample to 17.7 percent. Although these results need to to interpreted with caution since the
additional professional occupations are selected on the basis of an outcome (migration) rather than
their fundamental characteristics, we nevertheless veried that the fractionalization coecient in the
occupational choice regression with this expanded denition of professional activity remained negative
and signicant. Finally, we ran the occupational choice regression in other years { 1993, 1996, 1998
{ generating a pattern of fractionalization coecients very similar to the point estimates obtained in
1994 and 2000.
5.3 Fractionalization and Outcomes Related to Occupational Choice
An individual born in a county with higher ethnic fractionalization in 1860 is less likely to select into a
professional occupation in 1994 and 2000. Our interpretation of this result is that individuals born in
high fractionalization counties identify strongly with their local communities and so wish to avoid the
spatial mobility that comes with professional occupations. The regression results reported in Table 9,
Columns 1-2 indicate that individuals from high fractionalization counties are indeed signicantly less
27likely to migrate from the county of their birth. On average, around 58 percent of the individuals in the
sample migrate from the county of birth. The point estimates indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in fractionalization reduces migration by 8 percentage points (a 14 percent decline). Among
the other regressors, none of the 1860 county-level controls signicantly aect migration, but Whites
are signicantly more likely to move. Age is also (mechanically) positively associated with migration.
Does the eect of fractionalization on occupational choice and migration that we have just described
have economic consequences? The results in Table 9, Columns 3-4 indicate that while individuals born
in counties with a greater share of manufacturing and agriculture in 1860 are signicantly more likely
to hold a job by 2000, employment levels do not vary signicantly with ethnic fractionalization in 1994
or 2000.22 Whites and males are, not surprisingly, signicantly more likely to be employed, although
the importance of these individual characteristics declines over time.
In contrast with the results for employment, the income regressions reported next in Table 9,
Columns 5-6 indicate that high fractionalization is associated with signicantly lower income (in 2000),
conditional on being employed. Average annual income in 2000 was 33,000 dollars, and so our estimates
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization would have reduced income by 2,300
dollars (a 7 percent decrease).23 A greater share of manufacturing and agriculture in 1860 is associated
with lower income in 2000, with Whites and males earning signicantly more in 1994 and 2000.
5.4 Fractionalization in the County of Residence and Occupational Choice
The second prediction of the model is that historical fractionalization in the county of residence should
have no eect on occupational choice. This implies that non-professional workers must ow out of
the high fractionalization counties, while professional workers ow in to clear the labor market. This
prediction rules out the possibility that dierences in the demand for professional labor across counties
are driving our results.
To test the prediction that non-professional workers ow out of the high fractionalization counties
we divide the sample into individuals who stay and individuals who out-migrate from their county
22Although we focus on ex ante career choices, we noted in Section 3 that the Central Planner could also reduce move-
ment costs by allowing for some unemployment or by reducing career-related moves for professionals born in counties
with strong local identity. We see no evidence of such adjustments in employment. Restricting the sample to profes-
sionals, we do nd that individuals born in high fractionalization counties are less likely to migrate, but once again the
fractionalization coecient is insignicant at conventional levels.
23This result rules out an alternative explanation for the excess supply of non-professionals in high fractionalization
counties based on the idea that labor networks in those counties generate disproportionately high wages in non-professional
occupations. As an additional check, we restricted the sample to individuals in non-professional occupations and veried
that individuals born in high fractionalization counties did not earn signicantly higher incomes.
28of birth (by 1994 and 2000) in Table 10, Columns 1-4. Matching the results in Table 8 with the
full sample, fractionalization in the county of birth lowers the probability that the individual will be
employed in a professional occupation for both stayers and out-migrants in Table 10, Columns 1-4.
While the coecient for the two groups is comparable in 1994, it is substantially larger { roughly
twice as large { for the out-migrants in 2000. Some of the excess supply of non-professional labor in
the high fractionalization counties is evidently reduced through the selective out-migration of workers
from those counties. To test the accompanying prediction that professional workers will ow into
the high fractionalization counties, we restrict the sample to individuals who move into our Midwest
counties from anywhere in the United States. Regressing occupational choice on the county of residence
of the in-migrants in Table 10, Columns 5-6 we see that although the fractionalization coecient is
insignicant in 1994, it is positive and signicant in 2000 as expected.
The labor ows that we have described all work towards reducing the mismatch between the supply
and the demand for professional and non-professional labor across counties. Measuring historical
fractionalization in the county of residence in Table 10, Columns 7-8 we see that the fractionalization
coecient is no longer signicant and actually switches signs in 2000. It is only individuals born in
high fractionalization counties who are less likely to be professionals. Once the market has cleared,
individuals residing in those counties are just as likely to hold professional jobs, as predicted by the
model.24
One remaining concern is that the mismatch between the supply and the demand for professional
labor in the high fractionalization counties could have been driven by unexpected changes in the demand
for professionals in those counties rather than a strong local identity. Suppose, for example, that the
demand for professionals was systematically lower in high fractionalization counties historically and
then increased in the 1980's, with the restructuring of the U.S. economy, after our NLSY cohort had
made their career choices. To rule out this possibility, we regressed manufacturing share, agriculture
share, and county population in 1970, obtained from the 1972 County Data Book, on the same 1860
characteristics as in Table 4, Columns 7-9. 1860 fractionalization has no eect on economic conditions
in 1970, just as we saw earlier with the same conditions in 1990.
24The second prediction of the model that fractionalization in the county of residence should be uncorrelated with
occupational choice is based on the assumption that the entire labor market can clear. The test that we implement,
instead, is based on a restricted NLSY cohort. Note, however, that labor supply and demand should match in each
cohort in steady-state equilibrium.
295.5 Fractionalization and Individual Ability
Although individuals are assumed to be ex ante identical in the model of occupational choice, we could
easily allow for heterogeneity in ability within each location. If the cost of training is declining in
ability, then individuals above an ability-threshold would select into the professional occupation, with
a higher threshold in location 1 with stronger local identity. Suppose, instead, that identity is irrelevant
and the ability distribution in location 2 dominates the corresponding distribution in location 1. The
number of professionals supplied by location 2 would still exceed the number of professionals supplied
by location 1, and this alternative explanation would match all the results in Tables 8-10.
We have already ruled out variation in the demand for professional jobs as an alternative explana-
tion, but could variation in individual ability across counties as described above have generated these
results instead? Variation in ability could arise due to dierences in innate talent or the quality of
the school system. High fractionalization counties had superior transportation infrastructure in 1860
and so were most likely growing relatively rapidly at that time. It is entirely possible that particular
types of migrants were attracted to those counties, although we would expect migrants drawn to areas
with many competing ethnic groups to have been positively selected on innate talent. Given the high
rates of inter-county migration, even in the Midwest, we would in any case expect few families to have
maintained an unbroken line of descent to the present day in the same county. Moreover, we noted
in Table 5 that 1860 fractionalization was uncorrelated with education expenditures in 1990. Given
the weak serial correlation in our fractionalization measure, it is unlikely that it was correlated with
relevant measures of heterogeneity early in the twentieth century when important public investments
were being made. Consistent with this view, we see in Table 11, Columns 1-3 that fractionalization,
and all the 1860 variables for that matter, have no eect on AFQT scores, high school completion, and
college completion.25 In contrast, individual characteristics have a strong eect on AFQT scores and
college completion.
Even if innate talent and the quality of the school system do not vary systematically with frac-
tionalization, we might still expect individuals from high fractionalization counties to invest less in the
college education that is necessary to obtain a professional job. One reason why we do not see this
eect in Column 3 may be that there is consumption value to higher education. Ideally, we would
25The fact that fractionalization is uncorrelated with education also shuts down an alternative channel through which
fractionalization could aect religious participation (see Sacerdote and Glaeser [2001] for an analysis of the complex
relationship between education and religious participation).
30want to estimate the eect of fractionalization on the choice of college major, but this information is
unavailable in the NLSY. Nevertheless, notice that individuals born in high fractionalization counties
are less likely to have attended college out of state (conditional on having attended) in Column 4,
although this eect misses being signicant at conventional levels. This result may reect a preference
for being close to home or a recognition that the quality of the education these individuals receive is
less relevant for their future careers. Collecting the results with education expenditures in Table 5
and test scores and educational attainment in Table 11, there is no indication that individuals born in
high fractionalization counties are less capable or less prepared to invest in the human capital that is
necessary to secure professional jobs.
6 Conclusion
This paper draws a connection between ethnic labor networks in the American Midwest when it was
rst being settled, the local identity that emerged endogenously to support these networks and then
persisted over many generations, and occupational choice today. Individuals born in counties with
greater ethnic fractionalization in 1860, which we expect to be associated with stronger local identity
and better functioning parochial institutions, are signicantly less likely to hold professional jobs, which
come with greater geographical mobility, in 2000.
The results in this paper are relevant to the ongoing debate on \economic institutions" (Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson [2001, 2002]) versus \culture" (Barro and McCleary 2003, Tabellini 2005, Fer-
nandez and Fogli 2007) as determinants of growth. We nd that local cultural traits generate signicant
variation in occupational choice across what appears to be a relatively homogenous region { the Amer-
ican Midwest { and we conjecture that these cultural eects might be even larger across countries with
very dierent histories. At the same time, culture cannot be sustained without institutional support.
Social institutions such as the church and the family help sustain cultural traits, which in turn keep
these institutions alive. As long as these institutions continue to be useful, cultural traits can persist
long after the economic circumstances that gave rise to them have ceased to be relevant. The eco-
nomics literature has focussed much of its attention on economic and political institutions. Our results
suggest that social institutions, with their complementary cultural traits, might have important eects
on growth as well.
317 Appendix: Labor Market Equilibrium
7.1 Population and Production Technology
Two types of jobs are available in this economy: professional and non-professional. Individuals who are
ex ante identical live for two periods, working in the second period of their lives. Those individuals who
choose to occupy professional jobs incur a training cost Ce in the rst period of their lives. Individuals
who expect to end up in non-professional jobs incur no such cost. The expected output obtained from
a professional worker who takes advantage of career opportunities when they arise is  and the output
obtained from an non-professional worker with certainty is  < .
There are two locations in this economy with N individuals born in each location in each period.
On average, sN professional jobs and (1 s)N non-professional jobs are demanded in each location in
each period. However, these locations also face demand shocks, with two states of the world occurring
with equal probability:
State 1: sN + sN professional and (1   s)N + (1   s)N non-professional jobs in location 1.
sN   sN professional and (1   s)N   (1   s)N non-professional jobs in location 2.
State 2: sN   sN professional and (1   s)N   (1   s)N non-professional jobs in location 1.
sN + sN professional and (1   s)N + (1   s)N non-professional jobs in location 2.
Notice that these demand shocks are skill neutral, in the sense that the probability of receiving a
shock is the same for professional and non-professional workers within each location. The shocks are
also positively correlated for professional and non-professional workers within a location. We could
relax each of these assumptions without changing any of the results that follow.26 In addition, the
opportunity to enhance overall productivity by switching a professional working in a particular location
with a professional working in the other location arrives with probability P in each period.
Let the cost of moving be C1 for individuals born in location 1 and C2 < C1 for individuals born
in location 2 with weaker local identity. We assume that all workers are employed and that profes-
sional workers always take advantage of the productivity enhancing career opportunities when they
arise, in which case total output in this economy remains constant across all states of the world:
2N
h
s + (1   s)
i
. The competitive labor market equilibrium can be obtained in that case as the so-
lution to the Central Planner's problem of minimizing training and moving costs across both locations.
26Specically, we allowed shocks to be perfectly negatively correlated for professional and non-professional workers
within each location. We also allowed the size of the shocks to vary;  for professionals and  for non-professionals.
327.2 The Central Planner's Problem
Let the supply of professional labor in location 1 be x1. From the structure of the demand shocks it
then follows that the supply of professional labor in location 2 will be 2sN   x1 and that the supply
of non-professional labor in location 1 will be N   x1. We derive x1 as the solution to the Central
Planner's cost minimization problem. Expected cost turns out to be a piece-wise linear function of x1
and so it will be convenient to solve what is essentially a linear programming problem in three regimes:
Regime 1: x1 2 [sN   sN;sN + sN]
The supply of professional labor in each location is sucient to satisfy the minimum demand in
that location but does not exceed the maximum demand.
The labor ow in each state of the world can then be derived as:
Flow in state 1: sN + sN   x1 professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
(1   s)N + (1   s)N   (N   x1) non-professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
Flow in state 2: x1   [sN   sN] professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
(N   x1)   [(1   s)N   (1   s)N] non-professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
The Central Planner chooses x1 to minimize expected cost
E(C) = 2sNCe +
1
2
N (C1 + C2) + Px1C1 + P(2sN   x1)C2; (1)
where the second term on the right hand side is the cost associated with movement at the start of
the period and the last two terms reect movement of professional labor during the period. Because
C1 > C2 it is easy to verify that E(C) is increasing linearly in x1 and will be minimized at x
1 =
sN   sN. Labor ows with x1 = x
1 are then obtained as:
Flow in state 1 (x1 = x
1): 2sN professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
N(1   2s) non-professional labor from location 2 to location 1.27
Flow in state 2 (x1 = x
1): No ow of professional labor.
N non-professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
Regime 2: x1 2 [sN   sN   N(1   2s);sN   sN]
27To generate a positive labor ow we require s  1=2. This is a reasonable assumption since just a small fraction of
jobs (9 percent in our data) are professional. For the case with asymmetric shocks,  for the professionals and  for the
non-professionals, the corresponding condition is s  1=(1 + =).
33We now reduce the supply of non-professional labor in location 2, but at most to the point where
no non-professional labor ows to location 1 in state 1. In our set up, any reduction in non-professional
labor supply in location 2 must lead to a reduction in professional labor in location 1 by the same
amount. It then follows that the supply of professional labor in location 1 will no longer be sucient
to meet even the minimum demand in that location, while the supply of professional labor in location
2 will exceed the maximum demand in that location. Labor ows at the beginning of the period will
necessarily increase, with an accompanying increase in moving costs, but we will see that this may be
outweighed by the reduced cost of relocation for professional workers from location 1.
The labor ow in each state is derived as:
Flow in state 1: sN + sN   x1 professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
(1   s)N + (1   s)N   (N   x1) non-professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
Flow in state 2: sN   sN   x1 professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
(N   x1)   [(1   s)N   (1   s)N] non-professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
The expected cost can then be expressed as:
E(C) = 2sNCe +
1
2
[N + sN(1   )   x1](C1 + C2) + Px1C1 + P(2sN   x1)C2: (2)
Collecting terms, E(C) is declining linearly in x1 and continues to be minimized at x
1 = sN sN if
P < 1=2(C1+C2)=(C1 C2). However, the local minimum is obtained at x
1 = sN  sN  N(1 2s),
if the sign of the inequality is reversed. This will be the case if P and C1   C2 are suciently large.
Substituting x
1 in equation (2) above, it is easy to verify that the term in square brackets is greater
than N, the term corresponding to it in equation (1), which implies that moving costs at the beginning
of the period increase when going from x
1 to x
1 . However, moving costs during the period decrease
with the reduction in x1, and this eect dominates under the conditions on P and C1   C2 derived
above. Labor ows with x1 = x
1 are obtained as:
Flow in state 1 (x1 = x
1 ): N professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
No ow of non-professional labor.
Flow in state 2 (x1 = x
1 ): N(1   2s) professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
2N(1   s) non-professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
Regime 3: x1 2 [0;sN   sN   N(1   2s)]
34We now reduce the supply of professional labor in location 1, with an accompanying increase in
non-professional labor, even further so that professional labor ows from location 2 to location 1 and
non-professional labor ows in the opposite direction in both states of the world.
Labor ows are now derived as:
Flow in state 1: sN + sN   x1 professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
(N   x1)   [(1   s)N + (1   s)N] non-professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
Flow in state 2: sN   sN   x1 professional labor from location 2 to location 1.
(N   x1)   [(1   s)N   (1   s)N] non-professional labor from location 1 to location 2.
The corresponding expected cost expression is obtained as:
E(C) = 2sNCe +
1
2
[2(sN   x1)](C1 + C2) + Px1C1 + P(2sN   x1)C2: (3)
It is straightforward to verify that E(C) is unambiguously decreasing in x1 and, hence, is minimized
at x
1 = sN   sN   N(1   2s).
7.3 Equilibrium Labor Allocation
As described in Figure 5 and derived above, E(C) is increasing in x1 to the right of sN   sN and
decreasing in x1 to the left of sN   sN   N(1   2s) for all values of P. For x1 2 [sN   sN  
N(1   2S);sN   sN], E(C) is declining in x1 for P < 1=2(C1 + C2)=(C1   C2), whereas E(C) is
increasing in x1 when the sign of the inequality is reversed. The global minimum is consequently
obtained at x
1 = sN   sN for P < 1=2(C1 + C2)=(C1   C2) and at x
1 = sN   sN   N(1   2s) for
P > 1=2(C1 +C2)=(C1  C2). The supply of professional labor in location 1 falls short of the expected
demand sN for all values of P. Without uncertainty, the supply of professionals in location 1 could
still fall short of the expected demand, but only if P > (C1 + C2)=(C1   C2).28
28Without uncertainty in labor demand, sN professional and (1   s)N non-professional jobs are available in each
location in each period. Let x1 2 [0;sN] measure the supply of professional workers in location 1. It then follows that
sN   x1 professional workers would ow from location 2 to location 1 and (N   x1)   (1   s)N non-professional workers
would ow in the opposite direction at the beginning of each period. Using the same notation as above, the Central
Planner chooses x1 to minimize
E(C) = 2sNCe + (sN   x1)(C1 + C2) + Px1C1 + P(2sN   x1)C2:
It follows that x1 = sN if P < (C1 + C2)=(C1   C2). x1 = 0 and professional labor is under-supplied in location 1 if the
sign of the inequality is reversed.
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 Table 1: Ethnic Distribution, 1860-1900
Census year: 1860 1880 1900
(1) (2) (3)
Scandinavia
Danish 0.01 0.02 0.02
Finish 0.00 0.00 0.01
Norwegian 0.03 0.07 0.07
Swedish 0.02 0.06 0.10
British Isles
English 0.13 0.11 0.09
Irish 0.25 0.19 0.11
Scottish 0.03 0.03 0.02
Welsh 0.01 0.01 0.01
Western Europe
Belgian 0.00 0.01 0.01
Dutch 0.01 0.01 0.01
French 0.03 0.02 0.01
German 0.32 0.37 0.41
Italian 0.00 0.00 0.01
Swiss 0.02 0.02 0.02
Eastern Europe
Czech 0.00 0.01 0.02
Hungarian 0.00 0.00 0.00
Polish 0.00 0.01 0.02
USSR 0.00 0.00 0.01
Other 0.14 0.05 0.04
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: IPUMS 1:100 sample, including all foreign-born individuals.Table 2: Occupational Distribution, 1860-1900
Census year: 1860 1880 1900
(1) (2) (3)
White collar
Professional 0.04 0.04 0.05
Manager 0.04 0.04 0.06
Clerical 0.00 0.01 0.02
Sales 0.01 0.02 0.03
Farm
Farmer 0.50 0.41 0.31
Laborer, Farm 0.12 0.17 0.17
Blue collar, nonfarm
Craftsman 0.10 0.08 0.09
Operative 0.05 0.08 0.09
Household Service 0.05 0.05 0.05
Service 0.00 0.01 0.02
Laborer, Non-Farm 0.09 0.10 0.12
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: IPUMS 1:100 sample, including all foreign-born individuals
who report that they are employed and report an occupational category.Table 3: Transportation Infrastructure and County Characteristics, 1860
ethnic manufacturing agriculture
Dependent variable: fractionalization share share population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Railroad through county, 1860 0.049 0.001 -0.013 0.102
(0.022) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
Distance to canal, 1890 -0.668 0.169 -0.034 -0.469
(0.191) (0.097) (0.125) (0.102)
Distance to Great Lakes harbor -0.252 -0.066 0.100 -0.136
(0.073) (0.029) (0.048) (0.056)
Observations 401 401 401 401
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Distance to canal and distance to Great Lakes harbor measured in thousands of kilometers.
Fractionalization is one minus the the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share and agriculture share in 1860 computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.Table 4: Fractionalization in 1860 and County Characteristics in 1990
Year: 1990
agri manufac ethnic racial religious agri manufac ethnic racial religious
Dependent variable: share share pop frac frac frac share share pop frac frac frac
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fractionalization, 1860 -0.022 0.024 2.590 0.045 0.072 -0.080 0.003 0.018 -0.269 -0.027 0.011 -0.124
(0.014) (0.019) (0.792) (0.106) (0.020) (0.033) (0.015) (0.020) (0.854) (0.113) (0.017) (0.034)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.090 -0.056 1.636 0.176 0.084 -0.257
(0.038) (0.053) (1.063) (0.309) (0.055) (0.110)
Agriculture share, 1860 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.136 0.057 -0.962 0.049 -0.080 -0.119
(0.027) (0.037) (0.746) (0.225) (0.030) (0.074)
Population, 1860 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.087 0.030 11.716 0.326 0.246 0.124
(0.031) (0.026) (5.372) (0.110) (0.052) (0.076)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437 437 437 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Manufacturing share in 1990 defined as share of civilian labor force employed in manufacturing.
Agriculture share in 1990 is computed using farm population and total population in county.
Ethnic fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of (white) ethnic concentration based on 16 ethnicities.
Racial fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of racial concentration based on 5 racial groups.
Religious fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of religious concentration based on 18 denominations.Table 5: Fractionalization in 1860 and Local Government Expenditure in 1990
Year: 1990
total expenditure education health police roads welfare
Dependent variable: per capita share share share share share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fractionalization, 1860 0.143 -0.055 -0.011 0.014 0.019 0.006
(0.145) (0.047) (0.026) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Manufacturing share, 1860 0.432 0.065 -0.019 0.004 -0.050 -0.034
(0.469) (0.155) (0.060) (0.014) (0.030) (0.029)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.042 0.020 0.047 -0.011 -0.0001 -0.025
(0.410) (0.106) (0.048) (0.009) (0.026) (0.031)
Population, 1860 0.168 -0.167 -0.005 0.026 -0.046 0.000
(0.160) (0.047) (0.016) (0.007) (0.020) (0.010)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000 and population density is measured in thousands per square mile.
Total expenditure per capita is measured in thousands of dollars (1990).
Shares in columns (2) through (6) are computed as fraction of total expenditure.Table 6: Distribution of Denominations and Religious Participation, 1860-2000
religious participation
Measure of religious participation: church seats church members church adherents
Census year: 1860 1890 1890 1952 1972 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distribution of denominations
Baptist 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09
Catholic 0.11 0.13 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.33
Lutheran 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.20
Methodist 0.38 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.13
Presbyterian 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
Other 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.22
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Proportion religious 0.59 0.67 0.30 0.50 0.58 0.54
Source: Census of Religious Bodies.
Proportion religious is computed as the number of church seats divided by the population 1860-1890, the number
of church members divided by the population 1890-1952, and the number of church adherents divided by the


















Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Professional occupations are relevant codes in the Professional, Technical
and Kindred Workers category.
All variables except income and age are binary.
Income is measured in thousands of dollars (2000).Table 8: Fractionalization in the County of Birth and Occupational Choice
Dependent variable: professional
Year: 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fractionalization, 1860 -0.146 -0.163 -0.253 -0.316 -0.215 -0.395
(0.083) (0.088) (0.096) (0.109) (0.129) (0.126)
White 0.031 0.045 0.047 0.059 0.049 0.060
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Female -0.065 -0.023 -0.064 -0.021 -0.069 -0.024
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017)
Age 0.0003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -- -- -0.213 -0.521 -0.092 -0.482
(0.172) (0.213) (0.258) (0.244)
Agriculture share, 1860 -- -- -0.272 -0.431 -0.247 -0.400
(0.144) (0.160) (0.157) (0.157)
Population, 1860 -- -- 0.018 0.011 -0.017 0.044
(0.017) (0.025) (0.039) (0.045)
Ethnic shares, 1860 No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1209 1122 1209 1122 1209 1122
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
Professional is a binary variable indicating whether the individual is employed in a professional occupation.
Professional occupations are relevant codes in the Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers category.
Ethnic shares, 1860 is a full set of 32 ethnic shares computed as the population of the ethnic group divided by the total population in the county.Table 9: Fractionalization and Outcomes Related to Occupational Choice
Dependent variable: migrated employed income
Year: 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fractionalization, 1860 -0.388 -0.414 0.114 0.037 1.659 -11.722
(0.155) (0.138) (0.108) (0.065) (4.804) (6.183)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.071 -0.242 0.078 0.362 -1.195 -26.379
(0.305) (0.260) (0.230) (0.136) (10.268) (12.231)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.171 -0.317 0.031 0.253 -8.197 -21.016
(0.311) (0.222) (0.164) (0.107) (7.808) (9.359)
Population, 1860 0.021 0.065 -0.015 0.013 -0.210 0.449
(0.039) (0.040) (0.026) (0.015) (1.041) (1.691)
White 0.232 0.284 0.153 0.043 5.773 4.791
(0.048) (0.052) (0.024) (0.021) (1.850) (1.567)
Female -0.014 -0.014 -0.155 -0.059 -11.986 -14.476
(0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (1.122) (0.988)
Age 0.013 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.764 0.211
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.208) (0.312)
Observations 1598 1437 1614 1332 1251 1122
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Fractionalization is one minus the the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Fractionalization is measured in the county of birth.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
Migrated is a binary variable that indicates whether the individual resides outside the county of birth.
Employed is a binary variable that indicates whether the individual currently holds a job.
Income is measured in thousands of dollars (2000).Table 10: Fractionalization in the County of Residence and Occupational Choice
Dependent variable: professional
Sample: stayers out-migrants in-migrants current residents
Year: 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fractionalization, 1860 -0.182 -0.153 -0.213 -0.343 -0.016 0.205 -0.089 0.091
(0.105) (0.104) (0.124) (0.146) (0.094) (0.088) (0.074) (0.067)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.243 -0.078 -0.197 -0.674 -0.431 -0.098 -0.367 -0.046
(0.194) (0.225) (0.221) (0.260) (0.167) (0.237) (0.131) (0.172)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.225 -0.159 -0.277 -0.480 -0.254 0.045 -0.248 -0.001
(0.147) (0.206) (0.192) (0.237) (0.147) (0.139) (0.114) (0.104)
Population, 1860 0.041 -0.021 -0.006 0.023 0.048 0.008 0.041 -0.012
(0.023) (0.018) (0.028) (0.046) (0.034) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016)
White 0.054 0.026 0.016 0.061 0.086 0.062 0.072 0.048
(0.023) (0.021) (0.045) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.013) (0.020)
Female -0.026 0.028 -0.097 -0.057 -0.095 -0.076 -0.065 -0.031
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
Age 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.006 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 557 479 648 637 648 651 1205 1130
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Fractionalization and county characteristics are measured in the county of birth in Columns 1-4 and in the county of residence in Columns 5-8.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
Professional is a binary variable indicating whether the individual is employed in a professional occupation.
Professional occupations are relevant codes in the Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers category.
"Stayers" are individuals whose Midwest county of birth and county of residence are the same.
"Out-migrants" are individuals who reside in a county outside of their Midwest county of birth.
"In-migrants" are individuals who reside in a Midwest county outside of their county of birth.Table 11: Fractionalization and Individual Ability
college out
Dependent variable: AFQT score high school completion college completion of state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fractionalization, 1860 -0.535 0.016 -0.095 -0.228
(7.457) (0.100) (0.104) (0.145)
Manufacturing share, 1860 11.570 0.197 0.003 -0.420
(17.828) (0.160) (0.241) (0.311)
Agriculture share, 1860 -3.015 -0.017 -0.261 -0.535
(14.672) (0.143) (0.193) (0.308)
Population, 1860 -2.769 -0.052 -0.018 -0.029
(1.981) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030)
White 22.608 0.010 0.083 0.008
(1.626) (0.024) (0.018) (0.045)
Female -2.728 0.000 -0.039 -0.002
(1.248) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024)
Age 2.880 0.006 0.005 0.025
(0.332) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 2187 2023 2023 1154
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration, averaged across occupational categories.
Fractionalization is measured in the county of birth.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
AFQT is the score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
High school completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed high school, including GED.
College completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed a four-year college/university degree.
College out of state is a binary variable indicating whether the individual attended college out of state of birth.